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Pawan Kumar Sen
This paper is based on longitudinal public 
opinion surveys conducted between September 
2006 and April 2012. In it I argue that, according 
to this survey data, the majority of Nepali 
people still want Nepal to be a Hindu state. 
However, a significant number of Nepalis wish 
to see their country as a secular state. The 
surveys also reveal that the public’s preference 
toward the Hindu state is not accepted in all 
sub-national levels; a preference for a secular 
state is evident in some of the sub-national 
levels, which cannot be undervalued. This paper 
also establishes that the public’s opinion on the 
issue of secularism significantly corroborates 
the public’s opinion on the issues of federalism 
and republicanism. 
The partial correlation and multiple regression 
analyses confirm that the public’s support 
toward one new feature of the state 
(secularism) agrees with another new feature of 
the state (federalism/republicanism), and vice-
versa. Nepali identity before April 2006 was 
promoted based on monocultural values, which 
favored particular dominant groups. Other 
groups felt suppressed and excluded from the 
mainstream course of the state. Therefore, 
state recognition of multicultural values is a 
must in this time of political transition while 
conceptualizing a new form of Nepali identity.      
I argue that this will bring a sense of ownership 
of the state to all groups. As the process of 
writing a new constitution is currently underway, 
Nepal has the opportunity to legally recognize 
the voice of the minority. If Nepal’s democracy is 
to be made inclusive, a new Constitution needs 
to reflect the voice of the minority in its clauses. 
This not only guarantees the arrival of an 
inclusive democracy, but also makes the entire 
populace, including its minorities, true owners of 
the land and its Constitution.
Keywords: Hinduism, identity, public opinion, secularism, 
multiculturalism.
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Introduction
This paper presents a historical analysis of religious issue 
and investigates the dynamic of the Nepali public’s general 
view on whether Nepal should be a Hindu state or a secular 
state by using findings of seven longitudinal public opinion 
polls conducted between September 2006 and April 2012. 
It divulges what the Nepali general public (i.e. common 
Nepali populace above 18 years of age) thinks on the issue 
during this time, and how their opinions toward this issue 
undergo changes over time. Variations in the opinion polls 
by religion, ethnicity, geographical region, educational 
status, age group, and political party preference have been 
examined too. A primary reason for paying much attention 
to these six variables is that these are arguably the explan-
atory variables which significantly influence the public’s 
view on the state restructuring issues and are identified 
to be the statistically significant explanatory variables 
through multiple regression analyses1 (tables of analyses 
are given in Annex-1).
The opinion polls reveal that the majority of the Nepali 
public still prefer a Hindu state at the national level (i.e. 
on the whole). They consist of predominantly Hindus, 
hill caste groups, madhesi caste groups, Tarai indigenous 
groups, and supporters of Nepali Congress, rightist parties, 
and Tarai based regional parties. But, the proportion of 
those who support secularism is also very significant, and 
even forms the majority at some of the sub-national levels: 
among Buddhists, Muslims, Kirati, Christians, hill indig-
enous groups, and supporters of most of the Communist 
parties. So, the Nepali state’s official association with Hin-
duism is not universally accepted. The polls also confirm 
that supporters of republicanism and federalism are more 
likely to support secularism, while supporters of monar-
chy and a unitary state are more likely to support a Hindu 
state. At this time of transition, while the drafting of the 
new Constitution is still underway and obligated to follow 
a framework of republicanism and federalism2, the state’s 
identity with secularism is justified. 
The Historical Context 
Nepal has been constituted as a Hindu kingdom since its 
foundation in 1768. The Nepali monarchy had a historical 
affiliation with Hinduism; particularly with the hill variant 
of Hinduism3, which varied greatly from the orthodox 
Hinduism found in the plains of the river Ganges. The 
Hindu high caste hill groups (that consist of chhetri, bahun, 
and thakuri) had the highest social status, by which they 
were able to control the state’s resources, and enjoyed all 
types of powers and privileges while disproportionately 
excluding non-hill Hindus (i.e. madhesi Hindus), non-Nepali 
language speakers, non-hill residents and so-called ‘low-
er-caste’ Hindus (i.e. untouchables now known as dalit). 
The two fundamental characteristics of the Nepali state, 
Hindu monarchy and the state’s official affiliation with 
Hinduism, were taken as inseparable components of the 
state’s structure.
Nepal’s rulers institutionalized the hill variant of the Hin-
du and hierarchical caste systems, as the so-called Hindu 
high caste hill groups felt superior to others, while the 
marginalized others felt inferior to the former. This caused 
the hill indigenous groups (who were basically non-Hin-
dus), Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, dalit, and madhesi 
people to feel discriminated against. But since the end of 
the nineties, when multi-party democracy was reinstat-
ed in the country resulting from the success of the April 
1990 people’s movement (i.e. Jan Andolan I, which literally 
means ‘the first wave of the people’s movement’), increas-
ing numbers of people had begun to question the rationale 
behind the state’s affiliation with Hinduism. Particularly, 
it was articulated by janajati (indigenous) activists and 
leaders (elaborated upon in the next section). The Maoist 
movement has also amplified the identity issue and defied 
the religious, cultural, and linguistic monopoly of the 
Hindu high caste hill groups since 1996, when it started an 
insurgency against the Nepali state. The dominance of the 
Hindu high caste hill groups across ethnic, religious, lin-
guistic and regionalist lines was regarded as a salient cause 
of the Maoist struggle (Mishra 2007: 109). 
In the 40-point list of demands put forward by the United 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN [Maoist])4 to the 
government just before they formally began the armed 
conflict in February 1996, one demand was directly related 
to the secular state. In Point no. 18 of that list, the UCPN 
(Maoist) clearly demanded for the secular state by writing 
down, “Nepal should be declared a secular nation” (Thapa 
and Sijapati 2003: 214). However, the major political parties 
of Nepal - including the Nepali Congress and Communist 
Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN [UML]) - 
had not questioned the state’s affiliation with Hinduism 
before King Gyanendra’s move in February 2005, the time 
when the king declared a state of emergency and took 
all executive powers. During the writing of Nepal’s 1990 
Constitution, the Nepali Congress was guided by their 
great leader Bisheswor Prasad Koirala’s policy of ‘national 
reconciliation’ with the monarchy.5 In contrast, the United 
Left Front (ULF), a coalition of seven leftist parties, did not 
have strong support from the public to challenge and let 
alone abolish the monarchy (Malagodi 2013: 136). After 
the king’s declaration of emergency in February 2005, the 
major mainstream political parties and the UCPN (Maoist) 
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moved closer to each other, and an alliance between them 
was formed. The UCPN (Maoist), who had begun the armed 
insurgency against the state from 1996 onwards, was op-
posed to the 1990 Constitution. This party was insistently 
in opposition to the Hindu-favored provisions in the Con-
stitution. It called for ending the special privileges given 
to the so-called ‘high caste’ Hindus in terms of religion, 
culture, language, etc. and for the replacement of the 1990 
Constitution and other laws based on Hinduism with a new 
one based on secularism. The mainstream political parties 
accepted the demands of the UCPN (Maoist). So, secularism 
was only a means for the political parties to remove the 
religious basis of the king’s power, rather than their own 
state restructuring issue (Letizia 2011: 76). To reciprocate 
it, the UCPN (Maoist) also accepted the multiparty compet-
itive system and agreed to come under the peace process.      
After the April 2006 people’s movement (commonly known 
as Jan Andolan II) called by the Seven-Party Alliance6 and 
the UCPN (Maoist), the House of Representatives was re-
instated and issued a political declaration that proclaimed 
Nepal a secular state, along with other important decisions 
such as the reduction in perks and privileges of the king, 
the removing of the ‘Royal’ title from state institutions, the 
bringing of the Army under government control, etc. An 
Interim Legislature-Parliament was established in Janu-
ary 2007 by including representatives of UCPN (Maoist) 
and other political parties who were represented in the 
reinstated House of Representatives. The Interim Legis-
lature-Parliament endorsed the ‘Interim Constitution of 
Nepal 2007’ on 15 January 2007 replacing the previous 
‘Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990’. The Interim 
Constitution abolished some of the core features of the 
Nepali state. One of the core features of the state that the 
Interim Constitution brought to an end was the Nepali 
state’s symbiotic association with the Hindu religion. The 
Interim Constitution formally declared Nepal a secular 
state.7 However, this did not satisfy the hill indigenous and 
madhesi leaders, as it did not explicitly mention republican-
ism and federalism in its clause. The hill indigenous and 
madhesi leaders organized protest movements (commonly 
known as Janajati Andolan and Madhes Andolan) to show 
their anxiety, demanding that the Interim Constitution be 
amended in order to take into account the concerns of the 
hill indigenous and madhesi people. 
On 28 December 2007, the Interim Legislature-Parliament 
approved a bill to amend the Interim Constitution with a 
view to incorporating the demands raised by the hill in-
digenous and madhesi leaders. The amendment guaranteed 
republicanism and federalism by stating Nepal a federal 
democratic republic state in its Article 4(1).8 This declara-
tion was formalized in May 2008 through the first sitting 
of the Constituent Assembly. The official connection of 
the state with the Hindu religion formally ended, together 
with the abolition of the monarchy.
Nepali Identity and Hindu Religion 
Prithvi Narayan Shah (reigned 1768–1775), the king of a 
small hill principality called Gorkha located at the cen-
ter of present-day Nepal, founded the Gorkhali Empire 
(subsequently known as Kingdom of Nepal9) in 1768 by 
conquering other small principalities spread across the 
region, including three small principalities of the Kath-
mandu Valley. His successors further expanded the empire 
through conquests and brought the empire to its present 
geographical shape.10 During and after the expansion of the 
Gorkhali Empire, Gorkhali (now known as Nepali) identity 
had been constructed on the basis of the culture, religion 
and language of the Gorkhali rulers and elites themselves, 
who belonged to Hindu high caste hill groups. These rulers 
and elite thus attempted to create an artificial homoge-
nous national identity by promoting Nepali (previously 
known as the Gorkhali language, Khaskura, or Parbatekura) 
as the only state language, along with the Hindu religion 
and Hindu monarchy. This naturally marginalized and 
even excluded cultures, religions, and languages of others 
from the state’s structures. This long-term project of en-
forced homogenization thus effectively rejected the notion 
of national identity of the Nepali people based on multicul-
tural values.11 Ultimately, the Hindu high caste hill groups, 
and their cultural values, religion and language, became 
the dominant and privileged features of Nepal’s state and 
society, while other groups such as non-Hindu janajati (in-
digenous groups), Hindu lower-caste dalit (untouchables in 
the Hindu caste system), and non-Nepali speaking madhesi 
(low-land people who lived in Nepal’s Tarai region) were 
excluded from the mainstream of the Nepali state and end-
ed up as the under-privileged and marginalized groups. 
Many historical texts illustrate that Prithvi Narayan Shah 
wanted to make his kingdom asal Hindustan, or a true and 
sacred Hindu land, uncontaminated by Muslim and Chris-
tian rules. One of these sources is a famous text known 
as Dibya Upadesh, which is a collection of advices given by 
Prithvi Narayan Shah to his courtiers before his death. 
As the southern neighbor, India, was first ruled by the 
Mughal (Muslim rule) and then by the British (Christian 
rule), ‘Hinduization’ became the state ideology of Nepal 
since its existence (Gurung 2003: 2). In this context, the 
view of Prayag Raj Sharma (1997: 478), a leading scholar 
of Nepali history and society, is very important: he says 
that “The motivation for combining all the hill states into 
a single, powerful entity was not merely personal ambi-
tion but the wish to build a sacred Hindu land, distinct 
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from and secure against the non-believing Muglan and the 
English ‘Phiringis’ poised on the coast.” Harka Gurung, a 
prominent social scientist of the country, calls this act of 
Hinduization the raison d’être of the Nepali state between 
British India and imperial China (Gurung 1997: 501). Prithvi 
Narayan Shah and his successors promoted the hill Hindu 
caste system, dividing the society into higher and lower 
castes in their new empire. The hill Hindu caste system, 
which was a vertically constructed hierarchy by nature, 
was not based on equality among different groups in soci-
ety, but based on an unequal social status determined by 
birth and geographical origin. Thus, an unequal, hierarchi-
cal society in favor of the Hindu high caste hill groups and 
to the detriment of all the others (including indigenous 
groups, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, madhesi Hindus, 
and Hindu dalit) was promoted in Nepal as soon as it was 
founded. However, it is worthwhile to recall that the hier-
archical caste system was already entrenched in the prin-
cipality of Gorkha before the unification started,12 even 
though the system was not as rigid as it was to become 
later (Whelpton 1997: 63). In the Kathmandu valley, King 
Jayasthiti Malla had already introduced the caste system 
to newars in the late fourteenth century, which categorized 
newars into sixty-four13 castes according to the Hindu social 
code based on a hierarchical caste system (Gurung 1997: 
501; Ahuti 2004: 484).  
In order to strengthen the Hinduization in the country, 
King Ran Bahadur Shah (reigned 1777–1806) prohibited 
cow killing in 180514 (Michaels 1997: 86). Jung Bahadur 
Rana, the then Prime Minister and the founder of the oli-
garchic Rana regime, introduced the first civil code, Muluki 
Ain, in 1854 to be effective in the entire Kingdom based on 
the Hindu caste system and values. This civil code further 
ensured the higher status of the Hindu high caste hill 
group at the cost of others. It imposed Hindu caste rules 
(i.e. the Hindu hierarchical caste system) on egalitarian in-
digenous groups, giving them inferior status (Gurung 1997: 
501). This civil code formalized discriminatory punish-
ments of people from different castes for the same crimes. 
For example, chhetri, thakuri, indigenous groups, and dalit 
could be sentenced to death or enslaved for crimes such 
as adultery and murder, while brahman received lighter 
punishment, such as hair shaving and subsequent down-
grading in caste for the same crimes (Hofer 1979: 80, 108). 
Brahman was even exempted from some obligations to the 
state, such as certain taxes and compulsory labor (Lawoti 
2010: 87). With the promulgation of Muluki Ain, the ban 
on cow killing was made much stricter in order to protect 
holiness of the cow. The Rana regime actually wanted to 
control and homogenize remote areas and indigenous 
groups through this civil code (Michaels, 1997: 90). The 
centrality of the Hindu religion and values in the state’s 
structure continued even after the abolition of the Rana 
regime in 1951.Though there were some political and 
economic reforms, the “predatory character” of the Nepali 
state, as said by Toffin (2010: 43), did not change much, 
and the supremacy of hill brahman and chhetri on political 
and economic resources continued unabated. The country 
was formally declared a Hindu kingdom under the new 
Constitution promulgated under the Panchayat regime 
(1960–1990) in 1962. Executive power of the Hindu king, 
and entrenchment of Hindu values in the state institutions 
and public policies, was established through the 1962 Con-
stitution. The period of the Panchayat regime was the time 
during which the Nepali state made intensive efforts to 
evolve itself into a nation-state with a common culture and 
language (Pradhan 2002: 11). The state’s official association 
with the Hindu religion still continued with the promulga-
tion of the Constitution of Nepal in 1990 under multiparty 
democracy, which designated Nepal as a Hindu state.15
Identity movements by indigenous and other marginalized 
groups began to take place in the country, demanding 
equal rights including kindred religious freedoms after 
1951, when the Nepal became open with the abolition of 
the oligarchic Rana regime and the instatement of mul-
tiparty democracy. However, the movements were not 
strong enough to change the old structure of the Nepali 
state. It was only after the restoration of the multiparty 
democracy in 1990 as an outcome of the Jan Andolan I that 
political leaders and activists from historically excluded 
groups such as janajati and other non-Hindu communities 
had begun to demand a more inclusive democracy in-
cluding full religious rights of following one’s conscience. 
An umbrella organization called the Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) was established in July 
1990, and brought together about 20 of the ethnic and 
cultural associations. They began to assert their rights and 
identities with a new intensity. They demanded the state 
to recognize their unique culture, religion and language. 
Various groups and associations contested the Hindu 
identity of the Nepali state when the Constitution was 
being formulated between May and October 1990. There 
were demonstrations by Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim 
associations, and ethnic organizations representing the 
predominantly non-Hindu hill indigenous groups, which 
demanded Nepal to be declared a secular state. This stance 
was supported by leftist, liberal, and republican elements 
(Hutt 1993: 37; Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997: 444; Sharma 1997: 
488). The grievances of the hill indigenous groups and 
other non-Hindu groups against the Hindu state were 
intertwined with their perceptions of the state having 
privileged the culture and religion of the Hindu high caste 
hill group. 
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Even though the 1990 Constitution recognized Nepal as a 
multi-ethnic and multilingual nation, it retained the Hindu 
identity of the state.16 Thus, the identity movements after 
Jan Andolan I too could not bring significant reforms in the 
structure of the Nepali state. However, an open atmosphere 
(i.e. the freedom of expression and other rights) guaranteed 
by the 1990 Constitution provided ample opportunities for 
ethnicity and identity-based movements within the estab-
lished political structure. This compelled the state to rec-
ognize cultures, religions, and languages of all the margin-
alized groups. It allowed a space for the assertion of voices 
from the excluded, under-privileged, and marginalized 
people. Non-Hindu indigenous groups and other religious 
minorities continued to demand Nepal become a secular 
state instead of a Hindu state (Hoftun 1993: 19; Toffin 2006: 
233; Malagodi 2010: 68). Many of them also demanded a 
right to slaughter cows.17 The United Nations’ 1994 declara-
tion of the “International Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
People” for the period between 1995 and 2005 also added to 
the debate on cultural recognition and minority rights in 
Nepal. The Maoist movement further amplified the identity 
issue as it defied the cultural and religious monopoly of the 
Hindu high caste hill groups since the mid-nineties, when 
UCPN (Maoist) started an insurgency against the Nepali 
state. Along with other rights, it demanded equal religious 
rights for indigenous and non-Hindu groups, and called 
for ending the state’s alignment with Hinduism (including 
monarchy). These movements brought the issue of various 
rights including the religious right to the forefront. Exclu-
sionary strategies of the Nepali state even after Jan Andolan 
I were the root cause of the emergence of identity move-
ments (Lawoti 2010: 73). 
After Jan Andolan II of April 2006, the demands for secular-
ism, republicanism, federalism, and multilingualism gained 
ground. With the endorsement of the Interim Constitution 
of Nepal in January 2007, the Nepali state’s century-old as-
sociation with Hindu religion was formally eliminated and 
the country was declared a secular state. The declaration of 
secularism was taken as a major contribution to the mod-
ernization of ‘New Nepal’ (Letizia 2011: 70). Indeed, it was 
an important move of the Nepali state toward institutional-
izing a new Nepali identity based on multiculturalism.
State Restructuring Issues at Present and the Hindu 
Religion in Nepal
Basic characteristics of the Nepali state - (i) the Hindu 
monarchy, (ii) the unitary form of governance, (iii) the 
state ideology based on Hinduism, and (iv) the promotion 
of Nepali language as the only official language - were 
nullified after the success of Jan Andolan II. These four 
components had been the four pillars of the Nepali state 
until 2006. A sentence written by Prayag Raj Sharma might 
be appropriate to repeat here: “Prithvi Narayan Shah and 
those after him, based the country’s unification on four 
key ideas: the unquestioning power and authority of the 
Hindu King of Gorkha, the supremacy of the Hindu ethos 
in national life, social integration through Hindu social 
system based on caste division, and recognition of Nepali as 
the language of government, administration and, in more 
recent times, education” (Sharma 1992: 7). With the success 
of Jan Andolan II, Nepal’s political parties conceptualized a 
new form of the structure of the state: secularism, republi-
canism, federalism, and multilingualism. By the first sitting 
of an elected Constituent Assembly held on 28 May 2008, 
Nepal was formally transformed from a Hindu state to a 
secular state, from a monarchy to a republic, from a unitary 
state to a federal state, and from a single-linguistic state to 
a multi-linguistic state. Secularism, republicanism, federal-
ism and multilingualism are the four most important new 
state restructuring issues in present-day Nepal, but from 
here on, this paper will concentrate only on the issue of 
secularism. Detailed examination of the other state restruc-
turing issues is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
their relationship with the religious issue has been inves-
tigated by employing multiple regression analyses in the 
polls data. The main reason for examining this relationship 
is to understand how the public opinions on other state re-
structuring issues converge to or diverge from the religious 
issue. 
Methodology of the Public Opinion Polls
The opinion poll data used in this article are from two 
series of longitudinal opinion surveys based on a random 
(probability) sampling: one is called “Nepal Contemporary 
Political Situation” or NCPS; the other is called “People’s 
Perception of Safety and Security” or PPSS. The author is 
one of the principal researchers in both survey series.
These polls have geographically represented every part of 
the country in their samples, and each of these polls had 
a sample size of 3,000 respondents. They have employed 
random (probability) sampling techniques in all stages 
(from district level to respondent level). Districts were 
selected employing stratified random sampling, where 
stratification was based on five development regions and 
three ecological regions. Villages (i.e. Village Development 
Committees [VDCs]) and municipalities within the sample 
districts were selected by employing simple random sam-
pling. Wards within the sample VDCs and municipalities 
were selected through simple random sampling as well. 
Households within the sample wards were selected through 
the random-walk method,18 and finally respondents of age 
18 and above within the sample households were selected 
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for interviews using the Kish-grid (i.e. a table of random 
numbers).19 In this way, the polls have followed the ran-
dom (probability) sampling techniques at every stage, so 
that the findings of these polls could be generalized in the 
context of the entire population under study.20 The ran-
dom (probability) sampling is the only scientific basis that 
allows drawing an inference from a sample to a population, 
though there is always a small degree of deviation between 
a sample and a population (O’Muircheartaigh 2008).
Field supervisors and interviewers with sufficient experi-
ence were deployed in the field to take interviews of re-
spondents at their homes. The survey teams were as inclu-
sive as possible in terms of language, ethnicity, region, and 
gender. Before deploying the teams, two-day orientation 
trainings were conducted for them on the survey research 
methodology, their roles and responsibilities, and the field 
operations plan. They also had the sampling techniques 
explained. They were also made acquainted with the 
structured questionnaire format, so that they became fully 
familiar with the intention of each of the questions. 
The samples of these surveys have, indeed, truly repre-
sented the national population. The sample composition in 
terms of ethnicity, sex, age group, region, religion, etc. was 
very much consistent with the population composition as 
per Nepal’s 2001 national census (Sharma and Sen 2006: 
9-10; Sharma and Sen 2008: 11-13; Sharma and Khadka 
2011: 9-13). Annex-3 shows the detailed breakdowns of the 
samples across various demographic variables and their 
comparison with the national population. Therefore, the 
author claims that the findings of these two survey series 
closely mirror opinions of the entire adult population of 
Nepali citizens with a certain but tiny margin of error, 
not only of the sample respondents.21 In other words, the 
findings of these surveys are generalizable to the entire 
population.
Every wave of polls in these series more or less has 
followed the same methodology, because of which their 
findings are comparable with each other, and trend 
analysis can be conducted on their findings.22 The samples 
of these surveys truly represent the national population. 
The sample composition in terms of ethnicity, sex, age 
group, region, religion, etc. was very much consistent with 
the population composition as per Nepal’s 2001 national 
census.               
The Hindu State Versus the Secular State: Opinions From 
the People  
The issue of secularism has an important bearing in the 
present situation of Nepal, where the task of drafting of 
a new constitution has not yet been completed. In this 
context, the country should listen to the voices of its all 
people: both majority and minority, both advantaged and 
disadvantaged, and both dominant and marginalized. It is 
crucial that those responsible for drafting and enacting the 
new constitution should recognize the voices of the entire 
spectrum of the people, not of only majority, advantaged 
and dominant.
Seven collective waves of opinion polls from the two 
survey series, NCPS and PPSS, were conducted between 
September 2006 and April 2012 (see Figure-1 below for the 
survey dates). In September 2006 (the first time the survey 
asked a question on secularism, “Do you think Nepal 
should be a Hindu state or a secular state?”), a comfortable 
majority (59 percent) favors Nepal being a Hindu state. 
Some 31 percent favor Nepal becoming a secular state. 
There have been continuities in the public’s opinion on 
this particular issue. Over the time period between 2006 
and 2012, there are no significant ruptures in the trend. So, 
in spite of Nepal’s political parties’ decision to declare the 
country a secular state, a majority of the general citizens 
still want their country to remain a Hindu state at the 
national level. However, it can be argued that in a country 
where more than 80 percent of the population identify 
themselves as Hindu, only slightly more than 50 percent 
favoring a Hindu state means that a sizeable proportion 
of the Hindu population also think that the Hindu religion 
should not be closely or preferentially associated with the 
state. This becomes clearer afterward when the data is 
disaggregated at the sub-national level. The public opinion 
survey conducted in Sep 2006 (the only public opinion sur-
vey discussed in this paper in which reasons behind why 
the people think Nepal should be a Hindu state or a secular 
state were asked) finds that a majority of the people want 
Nepal to be a Hindu state because Hindu religion is a part 
of tradition, and Nepal has always been a Hindu state and 
is identified as a Hindu state by the world. Whereas some 
people want Nepal to be a secular state because religious 
freedom and rights of the religious minorities can be en-
sured only in a secular state (Sharma and Sen 2006: 34-35). 
Contemporary researchers on the religious issues, too, 
say that the former group of people’s aspiration to retain 
a Hindu state is connected to their fear of proselytization 
by other religions and cow slaughter (Sharma 2002: 30; 
Letizia 2011: 81), while the latter group of people’s desire 
for a secular state is associated with their demand of equal 
religious, cultural and linguistic identity rights, thereby 
rejecting Hindu high caste domination (Letizia 2011: 71, 
2013: 34; Malagodi 2013: 129).
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Only slightly more than 60 percent of Hindus prefer Nepal 
to be a Hindu state between September 2006 and April 2012. 
This proportion is almost stable throughout this period at 
the national level. However, at the sub-national level, pref-
erence toward a Hindu state among the people who prac-
tice Buddhism, Islam, Kirat, and Christianity has drastically 
decreased over the period, and has become significantly 
lower than those who practiced Hinduism. Particularly, 
Muslims, Kiratis, and Christians have the lowest level of 
support toward a Hindu state.       
On the other hand, a majority of the Buddhist, Muslim, 
Kirati, and Christian populace want Nepal to be a secular 
state. This clearly shows that neither did Buddhist people 
want Nepal as a Buddhist state, nor Muslim people desire 
an Islamic state. The same held true among the Kirati and 
Christian people. They only want a secular state. They do 
not want Nepal being a religious state. 
Figure 1. Public’s Preference 
toward a Hindu State and a 
Secular State. Base for Sep 
2006 was 3000, for May 2007: 
3010, Jan 2008: 3010, Aug 2010: 
3000, Feb 2011: 3000, Jun 2011: 
3000 and Apr 2012: 3010.
Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
Hindu 65 66 68 62 64 63 62
Buddhist 35 23 12 23 31 18 24
Muslim 15 6 9 10 17 13 10
Kirati 8 10 13 9 16 16 6
Christian 31 6 18 23 10 24 2
Table 1. Public’s Preference toward a 
Hindu State by Religion.
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The surveys also clearly show that two communities, the 
hill indigenous group and Muslims, are the ones who want 
Nepal to be a secular state, not a Hindu state. The former 
group has a fragile connection with Hinduism, while the 
latter group has no affiliation with Hinduism, only with 
Islam.
With regard to the public’s preference toward a Hindu 
state or a secular state, there is a clear division of opinion 
along the various ethnic groups.23 The surveys reveal that 
a majority of the hill caste group and madhesi communities 
(i.e. the madhesi caste group, Tarai indigenous group and 
madhesi dalit), excluding Muslims, are the ones who want 
to see Nepal as a Hindu state. Levels of preference toward 
a Hindu state among hill dalit and newar are also high. 
Support toward a Hindu state is significantly low among the 
hill indigenous group and Muslims.24
 
Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
Hindu 27 26 23 32 29 31 31
Buddhist 47 62 71 68 49 67 64
Muslim 73 79 83 90 73 75 71
Kirati 75 78 75 87 69 64 81
Christian 56 91 79 77 90 76 84
Table 2. Public’s Preference toward a Secular 
State by Religion.
Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
Hill caste group 59 61 65 64 65 67 62
Hill indigenous group 36 41 31 29 38 31 31
Hill Dalit 52 66 55 57 57 60 56
Newar 65 54 59 60 56 66 56
Madhesi caste group 75 75 84 66 71 76 76
Tarai indigenous group 81 75 69 66 70 36 62
Madhesi Dalit 74 69 91 71 73 70 63
Muslim 15 6 10 15 18 15 10
Table 3. Public’s Preference 
toward a Hindu State by 
Ethnicity.
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Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
Hill caste group 34 32 27 31 28 30 34
Hill indigenous group 45 46 50 59 45 58 56
Hill Dalit 41 22 25 33 34 30 32
Newar 31 38 36 35 34 30 39
Madhesi caste group 15 20 15 32 24 19 20
Tarai indigenous group 14 14 19 32 25 52 30
Madhesi Dalit 12 24 6 22 24 16 22
Muslim 73 81 82 85 72 73 70
Out of the five development regions, the highest level of 
public’s preference toward a Hindu state is in the Far-
Western development region. About three fourths of the 
people living in this region (73 percent) want Nepal to be 
a Hindu state as of April 2012. The Eastern and Central 
development regions also showed a substantial level of 
support for a Hindu state. 
As of April 2012, the highest level of the public’s support 
toward a secular state is in the Mid-Western and Western 
development regions. The trend of support toward 
secularism increased in these two regions between 
September 2006 and April 2012. This might be due to the 
significant presence of indigenous groups in the hills and 
Muslims in Tarai within these two regions. 
Table 4. Public’s Preference 
toward a Secular State by 
Ethnicity.
 Sep 2006 May 2007 Jan 2008 Aug 2010 Feb 2011 Jun 2011 Apr 2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
Eastern 58 59 41 44 61 46 64
Central 68 62 68 54 54 64 58
Western 46 55 66 58 48 58 39
Mid-Western 33 63 49 59 58 41 33
Far-Western 76 52 61 69 80 60 73
Table 5. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Hindu State by 
Development Region.
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 Sep 2006 May 2007 Jan 2008 Aug 2010 Feb 2011 Jun 2011 Apr 2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
Eastern 32 33 48 53 29 43 29
Central 23 34 28 40 35 30 35
Western 41 33 27 35 43 36 51
Mid-Western 56 25 21 31 33 47 60
Far-Western 20 34 28 27 20 37 11
The level of education has a significant influence on public’s 
view in this matter. The public’s preference for a Hindu 
state significantly decreases as the public’s educational 
status increases. The highest level of support for a Hindu 
state is observed among those who are either illiterate 
or have got informal education, while the lowest level of 
support is found among those who have completed either 
higher secondary level or bachelor’s level education. 
However, degree of differences by educational status 
diminished during the later years of the surveys.  
Similarly, the public’s preference for a secular state signifi-
cantly increases as the public’s educational status increas-
es. The highest level of support toward a secular state is 
observed among those who have attained either higher 
secondary level or bachelor’s level decrees, while the lowest 
level of support is found among those who are either illiter-
ate or have received informal education.
Table 6. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Secular State by 
Development Region.
 
Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
Illiterate 60 60 62 55 58 57 53
Informal Education 58 58 57 60 57 56 58
Primary/lower secondary 58 61 63 57 61 59 54
Secondary 63 61 52 50 57 51 57
Higher secondary 56 51 48 47 51 56 48
Bachelor’s and above 43 43 48 56 48 47 49
Table 7. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Hindu State by 
Educational Status.
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Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
Illiterate 22 23 20 32 24 27 27
Informal Education 32 31 31 34 33 34 34
Primary/lower secondary 37 33 33 40 32 36 43
Secondary 35 37 47 48 40 47 41
Higher secondary 43 49 50 51 48 43 51
Bachelor's and above 58 57 50 44 52 52 51
Table 8. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Secular State by 
Educational Status.
The surveys disclose that age is a significant variable influ-
encing the public’s view in this regard. Though a majority 
of the people, irrespective of age group, prefer a Hindu 
state, people belonging to younger age groups are less like-
ly to prefer their country to be a Hindu state, while people 
belonging to older age groups are more likely to prefer 
Nepal as a Hindu state.
 Sep 2006 May 2007 Jan 2008 Aug 2010 Feb 2011 Jun 2011 Apr 2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
25 and Below 59 57 52 44 52 53 52
26-35 60 57 60 58 58 54 52
36-45 58 59 61 57 59 57 57
46-55 58 62 62 60 57 60 59
56-65 60 63 63 59 61 53 52
Above 65 61 64 63 57 61 62 57
Table 9. Public’s 
Preference 
toward a Hindu 
State by Age 
Group.
Similarly, the level of the public’s support for a secular 
state is highest among those who belong to the age group 
of 25 and younger. The support is the lowest among those 
who are over 65 years of age. However, it is worthwhile to 
mention that a majority of the people in the younger age 
group too favor a Hindu state, not a secular one. 
 Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
25 and Below 35 36 39 52 41 43 42
26-35 30 33 32 37 34 39 39
36-45 32 32 30 37 33 35 35
46-55 32 28 28 33 31 32 32
56-65 28 28 20 27 26 38 38
Above 65 23 27 22 32 22 21 30
Table 10. Public’s Preference 
toward a Secular State by Age 
Group.
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The probability of the public’s support toward a Hindu state 
is significantly influenced by their political party prefer-
ence. Supporters of UCPN (Maoist) and small leftist parties 
(including Janmorcha Nepal, Nepal Majdur Kisan Party, 
CPN [ML] and Sanyukta Janmorcha) exhibit less preference 
toward a Hindu state than any other party supporters. The 
UCPN (Maoist) has been the first political party in Nepal 
which formally started a campaign with the objective to 
establish a secular state. Supporters of Tarai-based regional 
parties and small rightist parties (including Rastriya Pra-
jatantra Party [RPP], RPP Nepal, Rastriya Jansakti Party, Ne-
pal Janta Party, and those who support the king) show the 
highest level of support toward a Hindu state, indicating 
their disagreement with the constitutional move toward 
secularism. The Nepali Congress and CPN (UML) supporters 
exhibit a moderate level of support toward a Hindu state.
 Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 59 59 59 55 57 56 55
UCPN (Maoist) 51 45 53 49 51 45 41
Nepali Congress 70 62 64 67 67 64 60
CPN (UML) 53 52 62 54 59 59 57
Small rightist parties 71 74 77 74 78 67 70
Small leftist parties 50 55 68 65 52 64 38
Tarai based regional 
parties
79 84 80 65 68 78 76
Table 11. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Hindu State by 
Political Party 
Preference. 
A majority of supporters of UCPN (Maoist) and small leftist 
parties shows support toward a secular state as of April 
2012. Supporters of Tarai-based regional parties and small 
rightist parties show the lowest level of support toward a 
secular state. 
 Sep 
2006
May 
2007
Jan 
2008
Aug 
2010
Feb 
2011
Jun 
2011
Apr 
2012
All groups 31 32 31 39 34 37 37
UCPN (Maoist) 45 51 45 46 43 50 57
Nepali Congress 24 32 32 28 27 33 38
CPN (UML) 43 42 35 40 33 37 40
Small rightist parties 26 23 19 23 17 31 24
Small leftist parties 50 42 32 35 48 28 60
Tarai based regional 
parties
13 13 20 34 27 18 22
Table 12. Public’s 
Preference toward 
a Secular State 
by Political Party 
Preference.
All of these results highlight that preference toward the 
Hindu state is not accepted by all kinds of groups at all of 
the sub-national levels. The public’s preference for the sec-
ular state is evident at some of the sub-national levels, the 
significance of which one should not undervalue and the 
potential for future growth in public support of which one 
should not underestimate.
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Relationships Between Public Opinions on Different 
State Restructuring Issues
This section examines the relationship between public 
opinions on the religious issue and other state restructuring 
issues. The main reason for examining this relationship is 
to better understand how public opinions on various state 
restructuring issues converge to or diverge from each other.
The relationship is investigated first through bivariate 
correlation analysis and then through partial correlation 
analysis. After the correlation analyses, multiple regres-
sion is also performed for confirmation. First, Spearman’s 
bivariate correlation coefficients (rho) between the 
religious issue and other issues are calculated one by one 
to ascertain the association between the  public opinions, 
since the data used are ranked values, not ratio scales (Sne-
decor and Cochran 1980: 192; Field 2009: 180). Then, partial 
correlation coefficients between two public opinions (out 
of which one always concerns opinions on the religious 
issue) are calculated one by one by controlling the effects 
of the other two opinions. Partial correlation coefficients 
are calculated because they produce a truer measure of 
the relationship between any two variables than bivariate 
correlation coefficients (Field, 2009: 189). Therefore, the 
relationship between public opinions is examined based 
on partial correlation analysis. In this article, only the 
relationship between the religious issue and other issues is 
explained, not the interrelationship between all of them.  
Only two particular surveys have been used for this 
purpose: those conducted in September 2006 and January 
2008. The reason for using only these two surveys is that 
these are the only surveys in which questions related to 
all of the four state restructuring issues (mentioned in the 
previous sections) were asked to respondents in the same 
survey.
Opinions that show agreement with the old structure of 
the Nepali state are coded 1, while those that show agree-
ment with the new structure are coded 2. For instance, 
“Hindu state” is coded 1 and “Secular state” 2; “Nepali 
language as the only official language” is coded 1 and “Oth-
er national languages as the official language” 2; “Unitary 
state’ is coded 1 and ‘Federal state” 2; and “Monarchy” is 
coded 1 and “Republic” 2 in the respective questions. The 
“Other” responses, “Not understood”, “Not heard” and “Do 
not know/ cannot say” are treated as missing and excluded 
from the correlation analysis.
Now let us look into the partial correlation analysis 
between the opinions from the September 2006 survey. 
The partial correlation coefficient between “Hindu state 
vs. Secular state” opinion and “Monarchy vs. Republic” 
opinion is positive and statistically significant (r12.34 = .214, 
p [two-tailed] < .01).
25 It can be concluded that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between these two 
opinions: if the public supports a Hindu state, the same 
public also supports the monarchy and vice-versa. In the 
same way, if the public supports secularism, the same pub-
lic also supports republicanism. It means that those people, 
who support the state’s association with Hindu religion, 
also want Nepal to remain a monarchical state. In the same 
way, people who support the secular state also want Nepal 
to be a republican state. 
The “Hindu state vs. Secular state” opinion has a statisti-
cally significant relationship with two other opinions: the 
“Unitary state vs. Secular state” and the “Nepali language 
as the only official language vs. Other national languages 
as official languages too” as of September 2006. The partial 
correlation coefficient between the “Hindu state vs. Secu-
lar state” opinion and the “Unitary state vs. Federal state” 
opinion is positive and statistically significant (r13.24 = .165, p 
[two-tailed] < .05).
26  This indicates that people who support 
the Hindu state also wish to see Nepal as a unitary state. 
Conversely, people who support the secular state also want 
Nepal to be a federal state.
Monarchy vs. 
Republic
Hindu state 
vs. Secular 
state
Unitary state 
vs. Federal 
state
Nepali lang. 
vs. Other 
lang.
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients 
Hindu state vs. 
Secular state
.270** 1 .219** .120**
[2557] [2713] [180] [2589]
Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Hindu state vs. 
Secular state
.214** 1 .165* .188*
Table 13. Correlation Coefficients 
(Spearman’s rho) and Partial 
Correlation Coefficients between 
Various Public Opinions in the 
September 2006 Survey. 
** Correlation is significant at 1% 
level of significance (two-tailed), * 
Correlation is significant at 5% level 
of significance (two-tailed), Number 
inside brackets is number of cases.
78 |  HIMALAYA Spring 2015
Similarly, the partial correlation coefficient between the 
“Hindu state vs. Secular state” opinion and the “Nepali 
language vs. Other national languages” opinion is positive 
and statistically significant (r14.23 = .188, p [two-tailed] < .05) 
in September 2006. This reveals that people who favor the 
Hindu state also like to have the Nepali language as the 
only official language in the country. Conversely, people 
who favor secularism also want to recognize other national 
languages as the official languages.
By January 2008 (around one-and-half years from Sep-
tember 2006), the relationship between the “Hindu state 
vs. Secular state” opinion and the public’s opinions on 
other state restructuring issues had changed remarkably. 
Though the relations between the “Hindu state vs. Secular 
state” opinion and the “Monarchy vs. Republic” opinion, 
and between the “Hindu state vs. Secular state” opinion 
and the “Unitary state vs. Secular state” opinion are posi-
tive and statistically significant as in September 2006, the 
relation between the “Hindu state vs. Secular state” opin-
ion and the “Nepali language vs. Other national languages” 
opinion is not statistically significant in January 2008.  
As of January 2008, the partial correlation analysis between 
the opinions reveals that the relationship between “Hindu 
state vs. Secular state” opinion and “Monarchy vs. Repub-
lic” opinion is positive and statistically significant (r12.34 
= .26, p [two-tailed] < .01). In other words, the public’s 
support toward the Hindu state and the monarchical state 
converge. Conversely, the public’s support toward the sec-
ular state and the republican state also converge.
Similarly, the relationship between the “Hindu state vs. 
Secular state” opinion and the “Unitary state vs. Federal 
state” opinion is also positive and statistically significant 
(r13.24 = .087, p [two-tailed] < .05). This indicates that the 
public’s support for the Hindu state and the unitary state 
converge. Conversely, the public’s support toward the 
secular state and the federal state also converge.
Unlike in September 2006, in January 2008 the “Hindu state 
vs. Secular state” opinion has no significant relationship 
with the “Nepali language vs. Other national languages” 
opinion.
Monarchy vs. 
Republic
Hindu state vs. 
Secular state
Unitary state 
vs. Federal 
state
Nepali lang. 
vs. Other lang.
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients
Hindu state vs. 
Secular state
.165** 1 .084* .053**
[2725] [3027] [701] [2868]
Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Hindu state vs. 
Secular state
.260** 1 .087* .071
Table 14. Correlation Coefficients 
(Spearman’s rho) and Partial 
Correlation Coefficients between 
Various Public Opinions in the 
January 2008 Survey.
** Correlation is significant at 1% 
level of significance (two-tailed), * 
Correlation is significant at 5% level 
of significance (two-tailed), Number 
inside brackets is number of cases
In order to further confirm the results of the partial 
correlation analyses, I employ a binary logistic regression 
model27 for each survey, with the public’s opinion on the 
religious issue (i.e. Hindu state vs. Secular state) as the 
dependent variable (i.e. outcome) and other three opinions 
on republicanism, federalism, and multilingualism as the 
independent variables (i.e. predictors). Since the coeffi-
cient of correlation (both bivariate correlation and partial 
correlation) among these three independent variables is 
not high in the both the September 2006 and January 2008 
survey data (see Table 2.1 and 2.2 of Annex-2), multicol-
linearity does not exist. This validates the presence of these 
three independent variables in the regression model, and 
confirms that the regression model predicts the outcome 
variable. 
I find that all three independent variables significantly 
contribute in predicting the outcome through the binary 
logistic regression model in the September 2006 survey. 
Supporters of republicanism are more likely to support a 
secular state compared to those who support a monarchy 
by 170 percent (Exp[B] = 2.702), because the beta coefficient 
for this variable is positive (0.994) and significant at p < 
0.01.Since the beta coefficient is positive (0.861) and signif-
icant at p < 0.05, supporters of federalism are more likely 
to support a secular state compared to those who support 
a unitary state by 136 percent (Exp[B] = 2.365). Similarly, 
supporters of multi-lingualism are more likely to support a 
secular state compared to those who support single-lingual-
ism by 130 percent (Exp[B] = 2.302), since the beta coeffi-
cient is positive (0.834) and significant at p < 0.05. 
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B S.E. Exp(B)
Monarchy (1) vs. 
Republic (2)
0.994** 0.359 2.702
Unitary state (1) vs. 
Federal state (2)
0.861* 0.405 2.365
Nepali language (1) vs. 
Other languages (2) 
0.834* 0.338 2.302
Constant -4.055*** 1.012 0.017
N 175
Table 15 Binary Logistic Regression with Public’s Opinion on 
Religious Issue as the Dependent Variable (1 = Hindu state, 2 = 
Secular state) in the September 2006 Survey. 
*** p< 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
B S.E. Exp(B)
Monarchy (1) vs.  
Republic (2)
1.187*** 0.194 3.278
Unitary state (1) vs. 
Federal state (2)
0.440* 0.211 1.553
Nepali language (1) vs. 
Other languages (2) 
0.309 0.182 1.362
Constant -3.229*** 0.587 0.040
N 596
Table 16. Binary Logistic Regression with Public’s Opinion on 
Religious Issue as the Dependent Variable (1 = Hindu state, 2 = 
Secular state) in the January 2008 Survey.
*** p< 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
According to the January 2008 survey, two out of the three 
independent variables significantly contribute through the 
model in predicting the outcome. The public’s opinion on 
the linguistic issue has no significant influence on the out-
come. However, supporters of republicanism are more like-
ly to support a secular state compared to those who support 
a monarchy by 228 percent (Exp[B] = 3.278), because the 
beta coefficient for this independent variable is positive 
(1.187) and significant at p < 0.001. Similarly, supporters of 
federalism are more likely to support a secular state com-
pared to those who support a unitary state by 55 percent 
(Exp[B] = 1.553), since the beta coefficient is positive (0.440)
and significant at p < 0.05.
Thus, the binary logistic regression results further sup-
port the partial correlation results. All variables that are 
significant in the partial correlation tests are statistically 
significant in the multiple regression models too. Similar-
ly, the one variable (opinion on the linguistic issue) that is 
insignificant in the partial correlation test (in the January 
2008 survey) is statistically insignificant in the multiple 
regression model too. Both the partial correlation and mul-
tiple regression analyses provide confirmatory evidence 
that the public’s support toward one new characteristic of 
the state structure considerably corroborates with anoth-
er new characteristic of the state structure as well. If the 
public agree with one new feature of the state, they also 
agree with another new feature of the state and vice-ver-
sa. As of September 2006, there is a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between the public’s agreement 
toward the “Secular state” and other three new features of 
the Nepali state structure, i.e. “Republican state”, “Fed-
eral state”, and “Multi-linguistic state”. However, the 
relationship between the “Secular state” opinion and the 
“Multi-linguistic” opinion is not statistically significant in 
January 2008. It may possibly be due to the decline in the 
support of the madhesi communities (including the mad-
hesi caste group, Tarai indigenous group and dalit) toward 
the Nepali language between September 2006 and January 
2008. Another study conducted by this author reveals that 
majority of all the madhesi communities wants the country 
to adopt the multi-linguistic policy and stop the domina-
tion of the Nepali language. They increasingly demand 
that other languages spoken in the country should also be 
recognized as the official language at the local level as of 
January 2008 (Sen 2013: 202). On the other, the support of 
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the madhesi communities (particularly madhesi caste group 
and dalit) toward the Hindu state has grown up by Janu-
ary 2008 compared to September 2006 (see Table 3). This 
means that these groups of the people are increasingly in 
the favor of other national languages i.e. a new character-
istic of the state (in the context of language) as of January 
2008. In contrast, these people are even more supporting 
for the Hindu state i.e. an old characteristic of the state (in 
the context of religion) as of January 2008. Because of this, 
the overall relation between the “Hindu state vs. Secular 
state” opinion and the “Nepali language vs. Other national 
languages” opinion may have become weak and insig-
nificant in January 2008. However, the relationship stays 
significant with the other two opinions. This indicates that 
the public’s opinion on the issue of secularism has become 
more important with regard to the issue of republicanism 
and federalism than with regard to the linguistic issue in 
the later year.
Therefore, the main argument in this section is that the 
general public’s support for or opposition to secularism 
converges with their support for or opposition to the other 
three state structure issues: republicanism, federalism, and 
multi-lingualism. Similarly, their agreement or disagree-
ment with a Hindu state converges with their agreement 
or disagreement with monarchy, unitary state, and mo-
no-lingualism. However, the statistical association between 
secularism and multi-lingualism is weak as of January 2008.
Conclusion 
Though the majority of the Nepali public has not embraced 
the secular state as yet at the national level, the minority 
of the people who support the move to secularism is also 
substantial, and they are even in the majority at some of 
the sub-national levels. They include all types of groups: 
Buddhists, Muslims, Kirati, Christians, the hill indigenous 
group, supporters of UCPN (Maoist), and small leftist par-
ties. Significant minorities of the people other than these 
groups also wish to see their country to become a secular 
state. Thus, a significant segment of the Nepali populace is 
inclined toward secularism. 
The public’s opinion on one issue of state restructuring 
significantly influences its opinion on another issue of state 
restructuring as well. There is a statistically significant re-
lationship between the “Hindu state vs. Secular state” opin-
ion and the other three opinions related to state restruc-
turing issues as of September 2006. But the relationship 
between the religious issue and the linguistic issue was no 
longer statistically significant in January 2008. The issue of 
secularism is statistically significant in relation to the issues 
of federalism and republicanism in that year. This empha-
sizes the significant contribution of the public’s opinion on 
the issue of federalism and republicanism to the public’s 
opinion on the issue of secularism in the recent past. In 
other words, supporters of secularism also tend to support 
republicanism and federalism, while supporters of a Hindu 
state tend to support the monarchy and a unitary state. 
Since Nepal has already been declared a federal republican 
state, the country’s secular identity is now more justified.
The Nepali identity promoted before April 2006 was based 
on cultural monopoly of the Hindu high caste hill group. It 
was not based on inclusion, pluralism, and multicultural-
ism. This mono-cultural value based identity was erected 
on the suppression and exclusion of other groups, but 
plurality and multicultural values are a growing reality in 
Nepali society. Since Nepal is in the process of writing a 
new Constitution, this is a golden opportunity to legally 
recognize the voices of all minorities. If Nepal’s democracy 
is to become a truly pluralist and inclusive democracy, the 
new Constitution needs to reflect the voices of the minori-
ties in all its relevant clauses. This will not only guarantee 
the arrival of an inclusive democracy, but also make the 
whole population, including all its minorities, true owners 
of the land and its Constitution.
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Endnotes
1. Multiple regression analyses help to show the 
relationship between two or more than two variables and 
explain the strength of associations among them. 
2. The first session of the elected Constituent Assembly 
has already declared the country federal democratic 
republic on 28 May 2008.
3.  Unlike in orthodox Hinduism, Tarai brahman was 
ranked, not only lower than hill brahman but also lower 
than hill chhetri and thakuri (Gurung 1997: 502; Lawati 
2010: 85). But in Nepal’s Tarai and India’s gangetic 
plains, caste rules are followed as closely as possible to 
the classical Hindu pattern in which brahman (i.e. Tarai 
brahman) has always had the highest status. Dor Bahadur 
Bista, a prominent Nepali anthropologist, even calls the 
Hindu religion practiced in the hills of Nepal a pseudo-
Hindu religion (Bista 1967: 110), and says that the caste 
system in Nepal varies greatly from the orthodox caste 
societies found elsewhere (Bista 1991: 3).          
4. The UCPN (Maoist) was previously called CPN (Maoist) 
until it formally unified with the People’s Front Nepal 
(Janmorcha Nepal in Nepali language) in January 2009. Not 
to be confused with other leftist parties with similar names 
like the CPN-Maoist (note the dash in between), and the 
CPN Maoist (without dash in between). 
5.  It was the policy called by Koirala in December 1976 on 
the return from exile through which he wanted to make a 
compromise between the monarchy and his party, Nepali 
Congress, to protect Nepal’s national sovereignty and 
identity.
6. It was an alliance formed by the seven agitating 
parliamentarian political parties on May 2005, to protest 
against the king’s take-over of 1 February 2005 (when the 
incumbent king Gyanendra dismissed the appointed Deuba 
government, declaring a state of emergency and taking all 
executive powers).
7. Article 4(1) of the “Interim Constitution on Nepal 
2007” states that “Nepal is an independent, indivisible, 
sovereign, secular, inclusive and fully democratic state” 
(Law Books Management Board 2007). There is no mention 
of republicanism and federalism. 
8.  After the fourth amendment, Article 4(1) of the 
“Interim Constitution on Nepal 2007” states that “Nepal is 
an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive 
and federal democratic republic state” (Law Books 
Management Board 2012). 
9. Only from 1909 onwards, the Rana rulers began to call 
the country they ruled ‘Nepal’ (Gellner 1997: 5).
10. Prithvi Narayan Shah became the king of Gorkha 
principality in 1743. The conquest started in 1744 and 
came to a halt in 1816, when the Gorkha Empire and the 
British East India Company signed the Treaty of Sugauli.
11. Bhattachan (2001:47) writes that the rulers of Nepal 
used coercive measures of Hinduization, Sanskritization, 
and Nepalization to eliminate or at least minimize the 
diversity of language, religion, society, and culture. 
Another scholar, Leitzia (2013: 33), says that the Nepali 
state pressured the ethnic groups to adopt the language 
and culture of the dominant groups (i.e. bahun and chhetri) 
under the homogenization and Nepalization scheme.
12. The Hindu caste system was introduced in Gorkha 
principality by the king Ram Shah (reigned 1603–1636) 
(Gurung 1997: 501). 
13. Gyanmani Nepal, a prominent Nepali historian, says 
that Jaysthiti Malla had categorized newar community of 
Kathmandu Valley (which was called Nepal Valley at that 
time) in 52 castes (2055 BS [1999]: 192).  
14. The cow is considered to be the sacred animal in Hindu 
religion. Killing it and consuming beef are strict taboos in 
Hindu society. 
15. Article 4(1) of the “Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Nepal 1990” states that “Nepal is a multiethnic, 
multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, 
sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical 
Kingdom” (Law Books Management Board 2004).
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16. See footnote 15.
17. Still today, according to Clause 7(1) of Part IV of the 
current Civil Code 1963, any deliberate slaughtering of 
a cow is legally banned. Clause 7(11) of Part IV clearly 
mentions the 12 years of imprisonment for those who kill a 
cow deliberately. Additionally, Clause 4(1) of Part IV states 
that a person will be exempted from any punishment if that 
person kills someone to prevent a cow being slaughtered 
(Kanun Kitab Byawastha Samiti 2061 BS [2005]).  
18. The starting points for the random-walk are 
recognizable locations such as schools, crossroads, 
chautaras (raised platforms of earth and stones with a tree 
at the centre made beside roads and used as resting places), 
bazaars, temples, mosques, etc. At first, interviewers start 
to walk towards any direction randomly (using Spin-
the-bottle technique) from a starting point, counting 
the number of households at the same time. Based on 
the overall number of households, required numbers of 
households are selected using a systematic sampling.
19. Use of the Kish grid ensures that each eligible member 
in a selected household has an equal chance of being 
selected for the interview.
20. A scientific quantitative survey conducted with random 
(probability) sampling techniques produces a generalizable 
set of findings (Patton 1990; Sayer 1992; Weisberg 2008)
21. Representative opinion polls measure the public 
opinions of a population of interest (Kepplinger 2008; 
Weisberg 2008).  
22. Methodology of the surveys must be similar if findings 
of these surveys need to be compared with each other 
(Hellevik 2008).   
23. Nepali people are divided into eight broad groups of 
ethnicity in this research: hill caste group (that includes 
upper caste Hindus: chhetri, bahun, thakuri and sanyasi); 
hill indigenous group (that includes non-Hindu Mongolian 
communities: magar, tamang, rai, gurung, limbu, sherpa, 
etc.); hill dalit (that includes lower caste Hindus: kami, 
damai, sarki, etc.); newar; madhesi caste group (that 
includes upper and middle caste Hindus: yadav, teli, koiri, 
kurmi, brahmin, rajput, kayastha, etc.); Tarai indigenous 
group (that includes tharu, dhanuk, rajbansi, danuwar, 
dhimal, meche, koche, etc.); madhesi dalit (that includes 
lower caste Hindus: chamar, musahar, paswan, dhobi, 
bantar, etc.); and Muslims. Any Nepali man and woman can 
be categorized in one of these eight groups of ethnicity. 
According the 2011 census, their proportions to the total 
population of Nepal are: 31 percent hill caste group; 23 
percent hill indigenous group; 8 percent hill dalit; 5 
percent newar; 16 percent madhesi caste group; 9 percent 
Tarai indigenous group; 4 percent madhesi dalit; and 4 
percent Muslims. 
24. Data on Muslims in the sense of ethnicity and of 
religious affiliation do not match perfectly. This happens 
because some people from madhesi castes such as yadav, 
dusadh, kanu, musahar, kewat, dhanuk, dhobi, teli, hajam, 
halwai, etc. (in which the majority are Hindus) identify 
themselves as Muslims.
25. For simplicity, the “Hindu state vs. Secular state” 
opinion is labeled as Variable-1, the “Monarchy vs. 
Republic” opinion is labeled as Variable-2, the “Unitary 
state vs. Federal state” as Variable-3, and “Nepali language 
as the only official language vs. Other national languages 
as the official languages too” as Variable-4. Therefore, 
r12.34 denotes the partial correlation coefficient between 
Variable-1 and Variable-2 eliminating the effects of 
Variable-3 and Varaible-4. 
26. The question on “federal state or unitary state” was 
a filtered question. The survey respondents were first 
asked whether they had heard of federalism. Only those 
respondents, who had said they had heard of it, were 
eligible to reply whether they wished Nepal to be a federal 
state or unitary state. Those, who had not heard of it 
or could not give a definitive answer, were not eligible 
to answer the “federal state vs. unitary state” question. 
Because of that, not all respondents were supposed to 
answer this question. As of September 2006, only 180 
respondents had said that they had heard of federalism, and 
thus were the only ones who were eligible to reply whether 
they wanted a federal state or unitary state. This number 
was 701 as of January 2008. In the binary logistic regression 
performed in the latter part of this section, the number 
of cases has even gone down, which is logical. Multiple 
regression analysis considers only those cases where there 
are non-missing responses in all variables. If one variable 
has a missing response, the entire case is withdrawn from 
the analysis. 
27. The reason for employing the binary logistic regression 
model is due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variable. Public’s opinion on religious issue (i.e. opinion on 
“Hindu state vs. Secular state”) is taken as the dependent 
variable for which public’s responses are coded as 1 for 
“Hindu state” opinion and 2 for “Secular state” opinion. 
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Sep 2006 May 2007 Jan 2008 Aug 2010
Beta Beta Beta Beta
Hindu (Reference)
Buddhist 0.917*** 1.763*** 2.666*** 0.987***
Muslim 2.155 3.020*** 4.896** 4.060***
Christian 1.053 3.754*** 2.312*** 1.973***
Kirati 2.572*** 3.123*** 1.622*** 1.766***
Hill caste group (Reference)
Hill indigenous group 0.275 0.229 0.619*** 0.864***
Hill Dalit -0.098 -0.394 0.349 0.277
Newar -0.209 0.348 0.399 -0.102
Madhesi caste group -0.824*** -0.325* -0.764*** -0.019
Tarai indigenous group -1.125*** -0.820*** -0.306 -0.163
Madhesi Dalit -1.134*** -0.104 -1.331** -0.571*
Muslim 0.386 1.212 -1.230 -0.994
Eastern DR (Reference)
Central DR -0.662*** -0.039 -0.949*** -0.386**
Western DR 0.216 0.274 -0.820*** -0.615***
Mid-western DR 0.916*** 0.075 -0.779*** -0.658***
Far-western DR -0.853*** 0.608*** -0.614** -1.044***
Illiterate (Reference)
Informal education 0.351* 0.336* 0.750*** 0.008
Primary/lower secondary 0.481*** 0.240 0.692*** 0.067
Secondary 0.584*** 0.609*** 1.370*** 0.396**
Higher secondary 0.913*** 1.087*** 1.422*** 0.656***
Bachelor's and above 1.227*** 1.369*** 1.892*** 0.531
18 – 25 (Reference)
26 – 35 -0.063 -0.018 -0.303* -0.480***
36 – 45 0.044 -0.257 -0.216 -0.389**
46 – 55 0.114 -0.144 -0.259 -0.614***
56 – 65 0.037 -0.229 -0.472* -0.804***
Above 65 -0.320 -0.431 -0.893** -0.617*
UCPN (Maoist) (Reference)
Nepali Congress -1.042*** -0.779*** -0.345 -0.918***
CPN (UML) -0.291 -0.302 -0.314 -0.492**
Small rightist parties -1.134*** -1.351*** -0.898* -1.333**
Small leftist parties 0.135 -0.396 -0.044 -0.330
Tarai based regional parties -1.721* -1.627** -0.616 -0.724**
Constant -0.186 -0.655** -0.628* 0.314
N 2676 2724 2730 2816
Annex-1: Beta Coefficients Given by Binary Logistic Regression with Religious Issue as the Dependent Variable (1 = 
Hindu state, 2 = Secular state) 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
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Feb 2011 Jun 2011 Apr 2012
Beta Beta Beta
Hindu (Reference)
Buddhist 0.569** 1.967*** 1.555***
Muslim 3.046*** 2.716** 2.635*
Christian 3.386*** 1.690*** 4.938***
Kirati 1.874*** 1.226*** 3.493***
Hill caste group (Reference)
Hill indigenous group 0.778*** 0.893*** 0.804***
Hill Dalit 0.188 0.163 0.041
Newar 0.013 0.320 0.350
Madhesi caste group -0.235 0.044 -0.461**
Tarai indigenous group -0.075 1.222*** 0.206
Madhesi Dalit -0.035 -0.005 0.063
Muslim -0.349 0.670 0.530
Eastern DR (Reference)
Central DR 0.514*** -0.962*** 0.707***
Western DR 0.721*** -0.416** 1.808***
Mid-western DR 0.146 0.220 2.232***
Far-western DR -0.682** -0.255 -0.619**
Illiterate (Reference)
Informal education 0.431** 0.205 0.336*
Primary/lower secondary 0.204 0.372* 0.687***
Secondary 0.753*** 0.783*** 0.930***
Higher secondary 0.996*** 0.850*** 1.419***
Bachelor's and above 1.434*** 1.339*** 1.241***
18 – 25 (Reference)
26 – 35 -0.224 -0.050 0.105
36 – 45 -0.194 -0.062 0.133
46 – 55 -0.100 -0.067 -0.158
56 – 65 -0.279 0.184 0.195
Above 65 -0.645* -0.308 -0.071
UCPN (Maoist) (Reference)
Nepali Congress -0.873*** -0.633*** -0.744***
CPN (UML) -0.587*** -0.606*** -0.460*
Small rightist parties -1.835*** -0.889* -1.475**
Small leftist parties -0.330 -1.431* 0.329
Tarai based regional parties -1.000*** -1.231*** -1.171**
Constant -0.906*** -0.599** -1.813***
N 2724 2765 2764
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
If Beta coefficient is significantly positive, the respective 
category of the people is more likely to prefer secular state 
compared to the Reference category.
If Beta coefficient is significantly negative, the respective 
category of the people is less likely to prefer secular state 
compared to the Reference category. 
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Annex-2: Correlation among the Three Independent Variables (Predictors) 
Table 2.1. Correlation Coefficients (Spearman’s rho) and Partial Correlation Coefficients among the Three Predictors in the September 2006 Survey
Monarchy vs. 
Republic
Unitary state vs. 
Federal state
Nepali language 
vs. Other 
language
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients
Monarchy vs. Republic 1 .126 .021
[2776] [177] [2608]
Unitary state vs. Federal 
state
.126 1 .173**
[177] [181] [180]
Nepali language vs. Other 
language
.021 .173* 1
[2608] [180] [2788]
Partial Correlation Coefficients
Monarchy vs. Republic 1 .065 .086
Unitary state vs. Federal 
state
.065 1 .136
Nepali language vs. Other 
language
.086 .136 1
** Correlation is significant at 1% level of significance (two-tailed), * Correlation is significant at 5% level of significance (two-tailed), Number inside 
brackets is number of cases 
Table 2.2. Correlation Coefficients (Spearman’s rho) and Partial Correlation Coefficients among the Three Predictors in the January 2008 Survey
Monarchy vs. 
Republic
Unitary state vs. 
Federal state
Nepali language 
vs. Other 
language
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients
Monarchy vs. Republic 1 -.015 -.056**
[2921] [679] [2720]
Unitary state vs. Federal 
state
-.015 1 .162**
[679] [706] [681]
Nepali language vs. Other 
language
-.056** .162** 1
[2720] [681] [3060]
Partial Correlation Coefficients
Monarchy vs. Republic 1 -.005 -.129
Unitary state vs. Federal 
state
-.005 1 .172**
Nepali language vs. Other 
language
-.129 .172** 1
** Correlation is significant at 1% level of significance (two-tailed), * Correlation is significant at 5% level of significance (two-tailed), Number inside 
brackets is number of cases
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Annex-3: Comparison between the National Population Census 2001 and the Samples 
Table 3.1. Comparison between the Population and the Sample of the September 2006 Survey 
Demographic Variable Population Sample 
Development Region
Eastern 23.1 19.4
Central 34.7 41.3
Western 19.7 17.5
Mid-Western 13.0 11.5
Far-Western 9.5 10.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Ecological Region
Mountain 7.3 8.7
Hill 44.3 47.9
Tarai 48.4 43.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Caste/Ethnic Group
Chhetri 15.8 17.6
Brahmin (Hill) 12.7 12.9
Magar 7.1 5.6
Tharu 6.8 4.7
Tamang 5.6 4.3
Newar 5.5 7.4
Muslim 4.3 4.4
Kami 3.9 2.4
Yadav 3.9 4.3
Rai 2.8 1.9
Gurung 2.4 1.8
Damai/Dholi 1.7 1.6
Limbu 1.6 1.7
Thakuri 1.5 2.5
Sarki 1.4 0.5
Teli 1.3 0.8
Koiri 1.1 0.4
Kurmi 0.9 0.2
Sanyasi 0.9 0.6
Brahmin (Tarai) 0.6 1.3
Kumal 0.4 0.3
Rajbansi 0.4 1.3
Khatwe 0.3 0.8
Others 16.9 20.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Religion 
Hindu 80.7 85.5
Buddhist 10.7 7.2
Muslim 4.2 4.5
Kirati 3.6 2.2
Christian 0.5 0.5
Atheist 0.0 0.1
Others 0.3 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Since some caste/ethnic groups are slightly over or under represented, a weighting factor was assigned to each group to make it representative of 
the national population.  
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1. Demographic Variable  Population  Sample 
2. Development Region
3. Eastern 23.1 21.1
4. Central 34.7 33.9
5. Western 19.7 20.8
Table 3.2. Comparison between the Population and the Sample of the January 2008 Survey 
Demographic 
Variable 
Population Sample 
Development Region
Eastern 23.1 21.5
Central 34.7 39.9
Western 19.7 15.4
Mid-Western 13.0 13.2
Far-Western 9.5 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Ecological Region
Mountain 7.3 5.5
Hill 44.3 44.6
Tarai 48.4 49.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Caste/Ethnic Group
Chhetri 15.80 16.45
Bahun 12.74 15.12
Magar 7.14 8.41
Tharu 6.75 4.15
Tamang 5.64 4.75
Newar 5.48 7.24
Muslim 4.27 2.62
Yadav 3.94 5.68
Kami/Biswokarma 3.94 3.09
Rai 2.79 2.49
Gurung 2.39 2.82
Damai/Pariyar 1.72 1.76
Limbu 1.58 1.76
Thakuri 1.47 2.43
Sarki/Mijar 1.40 0.63
Teli 1.34 1.66
Chamar/Harijan 1.19 0.56
Koiri 1.11 0.70
Kurmi 0.94 0.83
Sanyasi 0.88 0.23
Dhanuk 0.83 1.23
Musahar 0.76 0.96
Sherpa 0.76 0.13
Dusadh 0.70 0.50
Sonar 0.64 0.47
Kewat 0.60 0.37
Tarai Brahman 0.59 0.93
Baniya 0.55 0.53
Bhujel 0.52 0.70
Mallah 0.51 0.90
Kalwar 0.51 0.70
Demographic 
Variable 
Population Sample 
Caste/Ethnic Group
Kumal 0.44 0.23
Hajam 0.43 0.80
Kanu 0.42 0.53
Rajbansi 0.42 0.27
Sunuwar 0.42 0.13
Sudhi 0.40 0.93
Lohar 0.36 0.76
Tatma 0.34 0.40
Khatwe 0.33 0.37
Majhi 0.32 0.56
Dhobi 0.32 0.07
Nuniya 0.29 0.56
Kumhar 0.24 0.20
Danuwar 0.23 0.50
Chepang 0.23 0.23
Haluwai 0.22 0.10
Rajput 0.21 0.03
Kayastha 0.20 0.17
Satar 0.19 0.10
Marwadi 0.19 0.03
Barahi 0.16 0.37
Bantar 0.16 0.07
Kahar 0.15 0.10
Rajbhar 0.11 0.03
Dhimal 0.09 0.03
Bhediya 0.08 0.03
Darai 0.07 0.07
Thakali 0.06 0.20
Tajpuriya 0.06 0.13
Mali 0.05 0.03
Badi 0.02 0.13
Meche 0.02 0.03
Sikh 0.01 0.03
Others 3.28 0.96
Total 100.00 100.00
Religion 
Hindu 80.7 84.1
Buddhist 10.7 7.3
Muslim 4.2 4.3
Christian 0.5 1.1
Kirati 3.6 3.1
Atheist 0.0 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Since some caste/ethnic groups are slightly over or under represented, a weighting factor was assigned to each group to make it representative of 
the national population.  
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Table 3.3. Comparison between the Population and the Sample of the June 2011 Survey 
Demographic 
Variable 
Population Sample 
Development Region
Eastern 23.1 21.1
Central 34.7 33.9
Western 19.7 20.8
Mid-Western 13.0 13.2
Far-Western 9.5 10.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Ecological Region
Mountain 7.3 7.4
Hill 44.3 45.1
Tarai 48.4 47.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Caste/Ethnic Group
Chhetri 15.8 12.3
Bahun 12.7 12.0
Magar 7.1 7.9
Tharu 6.8 5.6
Tamang 5.6 6.3
Newar 5.5 5.2
Muslim 4.3 3.9
Yadav 3.9 4.8
Kami/BK 3.9 2.8
Rai 2.8 3.2
Gurung 2.4 2.1
Damai/Pariyar 1.7 1.4
Limbu 1.6 3.9
Thakuri 1.5 2.0
Sarki/Mijar 1.4 0.9
Teli 1.3 2.8
Chamar 1.2 1.6
Koiri 1.1 0.7
Kurmi 0.9 1.3
Sanyasi 0.9 0.2
Dhanuk 0.8 0.7
Musahar 0.8 0.3
Sherpa 0.8 0.1
Dusadh 0.7 0.9
Sonar 0.6 0.1
Kewat 0.6 1.2
Tarai Brahman 0.6 0.9
Baniya 0.6 0.9
Gharti/Bhujel 0.5 0.2
Kalwar 0.5 0.9
Mallaha 0.5 0.7
Kumal 0.4 0.4
Hajam 0.4 0.3
Demographic 
Variable
Population Sample
Caste/Ethnic Group
Sunuwar 0.4 0.6
Kanu 0.4 0.2
Rajbansi 0.4 0.7
Sudhi 0.4 1.3
Lohar 0.4 0.5
Tatma 0.3 0.4
Khatwe 0.3 0.3
Majhi 0.3 0.0
Dhobi 0.3 0.5
Nuniya 0.3 0.1
Kumhar 0.2 0.5
Chepang 0.2 0.0
Halwai 0.2 0.8
Rajput 0.2 0.5
Kayastha 0.2 0.2
Marwadi 0.2 0.1
Satar 0.2 0.1
Jhangar 0.2 0.3
Bantar 0.2 0.1
Barai 0.2 0.4
Kahar 0.2 0.3
Gangai 0.1 1.1
Lodha 0.1 0.0
Rajbhar 0.1 0.0
Dhimal 0.1 0.0
Bhote 0.1 1.3
Yakha 0.1 0.0
Darai 0.1 0.1
Tajpuriya 0.1 0.3
Thakali 0.1 0.0
Mali 0.1 0.1
Bangali 0.0 0.0
Gandharva 0.0 0.0
Badi 0.0 0.1
Others 3.0 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Religion 
Hindu 80.7 82.7
Buddhist 10.7 8.0
Muslim 4.2 4.2
Christian 0.5 1.8
Kirati 3.6 2.9
Atheist 0.0 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Since some caste/ethnic groups are slightly over or under represented, a weighting factor was assigned to each group to make it representative of 
the national population.  
